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INTRODUCTION

The Affordable Care Act (ACA) 1 grew out of a longstanding
desire to bring universal healthcare coverage to Americans. 2 But
universal healthcare was not the only goal. Some longed to see
ERISA’s preemption of state-law remedies softened, so that
healthcare claims in ERISA plans could no longer be delayed and
denied with impunity. Reform of ERISA’s preemption provision
was for years a rallying cry for judges forced to mete out ERISA
preemption’s stark consequences; judges observed repeatedly that
there should be some sort of disincentive to improper denials. 3
While the ACA now extends coverage to more Americans,
ERISA preemption remains unchanged. So, when ERISA healthcare
plans—which insure most Americans—improperly delay or deny
healthcare claims, the plans still risk nothing more than the eventual
payment of that claim’s value. ERISA preemption takes away state
law remedies and replaces all of them with an ERISA claim, whose
remedy is at most the value of the denied benefit. Plans need not
compensate participants for consequences resulting from the plans’
claims processing mistakes. The ACA leaves these rules untouched.
With preemption reform extinguished, the ACA instead offers little
more than change at the margins to claims processing, together with
the new availability of external review for ERISA claim denials.
This article posits that ERISA claims processing and
preemption reform is the unfinished business of the ACA—without

1. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
124 Stat. 199 (2010).
2. The ACA’s goal is to “expand health insurance coverage while also
reforming the health care delivery system to improve quality and value. It also
includes provisions to eliminate disparities in health care, strengthen public
health and health access, invest in the expansion and improvement of the
health workforce, and encourage consumer and patient wellness in both the
community and the workplace.” Reform Overview: Summary of the Health
Reform Legislation, Health Reform GPS, http://healthreformgps.org/summaryof-the-legislation/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014).
3. See, e.g., Gatlin v. Nat’l Healthcare Corp., 16 F. App’x. 283, 290 (6th Cir.
2001) (noting that “a stiffer penalty encourages plan administrators to alter
their behavior with respect to employee appeals...”); Perrin v. Hartford Life
Ins. Co., No. 06-182-JBC, 2008 WL 2705451, at *4 (E.D. Ky. July 7, 2008)
(determining an insurer will take a closer look at the administrative record
and its denial decisions if it is faced with more than the prospect of merely
reinstating benefits”); Elliott v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 04-174-DLB, 2007 WL
1558519, at *3 (E.D. Ky. May 29, 2007) (stating that insurance companies
“would likely take a much closer look at denial decisions, and the presentation
of that decision, if forced to take into account the possibility that fees will be
awarded”); Powell v. Premier Mfg. Support Servs., Inc., No. Civ A. 01-05-0012,
2006 WL 1529470, at *10 (M.D. Tenn. June 1, 2006) (noting that “[a] fee
award serves as a deterrent to conclusory statements that are devoid of
specific and fact-supported reasons for denial of benefits”).
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it, the consumer remains consistently disadvantaged by both the
process and substance of healthcare claims processing. In terms of
process, established principles of human behavior such as framing
and inertia continue to ensure that the claims process flows
always in the health plan’s favor and few consumers question their
assigned share of the costs. On the other hand, the ACA attempts
to reform the claims process by adding external claims review; yet
seen in another light, these purportedly ameliorative steps are
new roadblocks between the healthcare consumer and the
accountability that results from a published judicial opinion.
Substantively, the ACA leaves ERISA preemption intact so
that plan participants with denied claims must work tirelessly and
with exacting attention to detail in order to appeal and eventually
win back—at most—the value of the denied or delayed claim.
Without further changes to the claims process and ultimately, to
ERISA preemption, the ACA includes more people in health plans
but also leaves them vulnerable to the vagaries of health plan
decision-makers. The promise of universal, meaningful healthcare
coverage therefore remains incomplete.

II.

ERISA PREEMPTION REFORM AS A LONGSTANDING
TENET OF HEALTHCARE REFORM

Since the early twentieth century, a healthcare reform
movement has sought broader access to healthcare for Americans. 4
Passed into law in 1974, ERISA did not become part of this reform
agenda until the harsh impact of ERISA’s preemption of state laws
became clear. 5 Since then, preemption reform has waxed and
waned in its presence and importance on the legislative and
healthcare reform agenda.

4. See STAFF OF THE WASH. POST, LANDMARK: THE INSIDE STORY OF
AMERICA’S NEW HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR US ALL 2 (2010)
(discussing the broad implications of passing the ACA). The ideas that
resulted in the ACA have been part of the public discourse in America for a
century. Id. Theodore Roosevelt enunciated the idea of healthcare for all
Americans in the early 20th century. Id.
5. In Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, 401 U.S. 41 (1987), a plaintiff brought a
tortious breach of contract claim against Pilot Life, based on the company’s
alleged bad faith denial of the plaintiff’s disability benefits claim. Faced with
ERISA preemption, the plaintiff argued that ERISA’s “savings” clause applied,
because the law was one that regulated insurance. Id. at 48. The Supreme
Court disagreed, holding the state law claims were not “saved” because they
were not specifically directed at the insurance industry. Id. at 56-57. Thus,
ERISA’s preemption provision was interpreted broadly, to cut off state
remedies even for those whose benefits were improperly denied. Id.
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A. ERISA’s Limited Remedies and the Preemption
Reform Movement
ERISA preemption is notorious for the limited remedies that it
provides when plan participants’ claims are delayed or denied
improperly. ERISA preempts all state laws that “relate to” ERISA
plans, as well as causes of action that duplicate or supplant a claim
under ERISA’s enforcement provisions. 6 The result for plan
participants is that when plans delay payment or do not follow
procedural requirements, there is generally no remedy. 7 Even when
plans wrongfully fail to pay participants’ claims, the participant can
recover only the value of the benefit that should have been paid
originally. 8 The recovery of attorney’s fees is far from certain, even
for successful ERISA plaintiffs. 9 Recently, there has been some hope

6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132, 1144.
7. See, e.g., Amos v. Plan Adm’r of Orion Healthcorp, Inc., Employee Ben.
Plans, H-11-4623, 2013 WL 5964506, *18 (S.D. Tex. 2013) (stating that
“ERISA does not require strict compliance with its procedural requirements,
mandating only that plan administrators substantially comply with the
statute and accompanying regulations”); Lacy v. Fulbright & Jaworski, 405
F.3d 254, 256-57 (5th Cir. 2005) (determining after studying § 1133 of ERISA
that “even if the denial notice were held to fall short of strict compliance with
those requirements, it is indisputably in substantial compliance,” and the
notice will “suffice.”); Wade v. Hewlett-Packard Dev. Co. LP Short Term
Disability Plan, 493 F.3d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 2007) (noting that the “[f]ailure to
fulfill procedural requirements usually does not give rise to a substantive
damage remedy” (quoting Hines v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 207, 211
(5th Cir. 1995))).
8. “Section 514 preemption of state law, and, therefore, state remedies,
leave ERISA’s section 502(a) civil enforcement scheme as the sole avenue of
relief for negligent medical necessity and other benefits determinations.
Appropriate relief would normally be found by filing a state tort claim for
monetary damages, but under section 514, this is no longer possible since state
tort or legislative relief would not be saved as limited to the business of
insurance. Yet, section 502 only permits equitable relief for obtaining benefits
that have been denied or delayed. Ex ante, this can require a patient to pursue
the plan’s administrative appeals process and/or retain an attorney and seek
preliminary injunctive relief while in the midst of a health crisis—a daunting
process for even healthy claimants.” Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, Drawing Lines
in Shifting Sands: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Mixed Messages on ERISA
Preemption Imperil Health Care Reform, 36 J. LEGIS. 91, 97 (2010).
9. See, e.g., Graham v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 501 F.3d 1153,
1162 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that attorney’s fee issue was not ripe until after
plan administrator’s review on remand); Quinn v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
Ass’n, 161 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming lower court’s holding that
defendant did not complete a proper vocational review and that denial of
disability benefits was arbitrary and capricious but reversing fee award
because defendant’s decision was not “totally lacking in justification”); St.
Joseph’s Hosp. v. Carl Klemm, Inc., 459 F. Supp. 2d 824, 834 (W.D. Wis.
2006) (denying motion for attorney’s fees, based on the absence of evidence
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for ERISA claimants seeking equitable relief for breach of fiduciary
duty; the exact contours of that relief are being developed. 10
When ERISA was enacted, the healthcare landscape was quite
different, with most individuals receiving health insurance from
plans that were regulated by state laws. 11 When ERISA was
initially discussed and developed, employer-sponsored health plans
were hardly discussed, except with regard to fiduciary duty and
reporting rules. 12 Because state law was understood to govern
health insurance, insurance contracts were left out of ERISA’s
general preemption of state law. 13 As employers discovered the
advantages to self-funded ERISA-governed plans, 14 the number of
ERISA plans increased dramatically. 15 Also, at the time ERISA was
enacted, insurers and employers tended not to question physicians’
diagnostic decisions—if a physician judged a therapy necessary, it

that defendant was “simply out to harass” plan participant).
10. See, e.g., Kenseth v. Dean Health Plan, Inc., 722 F.3d 869 (7th Cir.
2013); Susan Harthill, The Supreme Court Fills A Gaping Hole: Cigna Corp. v.
Amara Clarifies the Scope of Equitable Relief Under ERISA, 45 J. Mar. L.R.
767 (Spring 2012) (analyzing the Supreme Court’s decision to recognize
claimant’s right to sue for breach of fiduciary duty).
11. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY
ACT OF 1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY 281-82 (2004); ERISA Preemption:
Remedies for Denied or Delayed Health Claims, Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Labor, Health, and Human Services, Education and Related
Agencies of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. at 8
(statement of Olena Berg, Assistant Secretary, Pension and Welfare Benefits
Administration, Department of Labor) [hereinafter Senate Hearing], available
at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-105shrg50024/pdf/CHRG-105shrg50024.pdf.
12. WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 281.
13. Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 8-9.
14. In a notorious example of an insurance executive’s frank assessment of
ERISA’s advantages, the executive noted in a memo that “[t]he advantages of
ERISA… are enormous: state law is preempted by federal law, there are no
jury trials, there are no compensatory or punitive damages, relief is usually
limited to the amount of benefit in question, and claims administrators may
receive a deferential standard of review…[For a set of] 12 claim situations
where we settled for $7.8 million in the aggregate…[i]f these 12 cases had
been covered by ERISA, our liability would have been between zero and $0.5
million.” The memorandum goes on to note: “While our objective is to pay all
valid claims and deny invalid claims, there are gray areas, and
ERISA applicability may influence our course of action.” Memorandum from
Jeff McCall to IDC Mgmt. Grp. & Glenn Felton (Oct. 2, 1995), available at
www.erisa-claims.com/library/Provident%20memo.pdf.
15. “Sixty-one percent of covered workers are in a self-funded plan, similar
to the percentage reported in 2012. The percentage of covered workers who are
in a plan that is completely or partially self-funded has increased over time
from 49% in 2000 to 54% in 2005 and to 59% in 2010.” The Kaiser Family
Found. & Health Research & Educ. Trust, Employer Health Benefits: 2013
Annual Survey 176 (2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files
.wordpress.com/2013/08/8465-employer-health-benefits-20131.pdf.
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was accepted as such. 16
Once the harsh consequences of ERISA preemption began to
take shape, individual cases made their way to the press and to
Congressional offices, eventually coalescing into the goal of ERISA
preemption reform. 17 A few notorious cases became touchstones of
the reform movement. 18 There are numerous, less celebrated cases
of plans ignoring the regulations or committing serious procedural
violations without remedies. 19 ERISA preemption, which employers
and plans had long enjoyed, thus became a political liability. 20
As the ERISA preemption reform movement coalesced, so did a
highly committed insurer and plan sponsor opposition. The lobbying
effort against ERISA preemption reform is remarkable for its
consistency, organization, and effectiveness. Each time politicians
introduced legislation that would permit plaintiffs to seek state
remedies against plans that improperly deny healthcare claims,

16. WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 283.
17. WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 284 (noting that a number of highlypublicized cases led to a “political backlash against managed care that led to
state and federal legislative initiatives”).
18. In one such case, a doctor recommended that a woman with a high-risk
pregnancy be admitted to hospital; based on United Healthcare’s utilization
review, the hospitalization was denied and the fetus went into distress and
died. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1992).
When she sued for wrongful death, among other claims, her state claims were
all preempted by ERISA. Id. at 1338. The case was mentioned during Senate
hearings on ERISA reform and became a rallying cry for ERISA reformers.
See, e.g., Senate Hearing supra note 11 (referencing the Corcorans’ story
multiple times as a basis for why reform is necessary).
19. See, e.g., LaFleur v. La. Health Serv. & Indem. Co., 563 F.3d 148, 157
(5th Cir. 2009) (noting that substantive damages for a flagrant regulatory
violation could include retroactive reinstatement of benefits but that the court
“ha[s] not fully identified the scope of available remedies” for procedural
violations); Abatie v. Alta Health & Life Ins., 458 F.3d 955, 971 (9th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the most flagrant disregard for claims regulations can result in
de novo review of the plan administrator’s decision; citing no possibility of a
substantive remedy); Bard v. Bos. Shipping Ass’n, 471 F.3d 229, 244 (1st Cir.
2006) (striking evidence and awarding benefits based on remaining evidence
where procedural violations were “serious, had a connection to the substantive
decision reached, and call[ed] into question the integrity of the benefits-denial
decision itself”). In Schoedinger v. United Healthcare, No. 4:04-cv-664 SNL,
2006 WL 3803935, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2006), the court awarded attorney’s
fees to an insured who had faced repeated delays and denials of his claims.
The court noted: “Whether it be purposeful or negligent, insurance companies
regularly reduce and deny claims without cause, thereby increasing the cost of
healthcare to providers and patients alike. If it became cost prohibitive for
insurance companies to engage in that behavior, it would incentivize more
accurate claims administration and processing in the future.” Id.
20. Clark C. Havighurst, How the Healthcare Revolution Fell Short, 65
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 76 (2002) (noting that ERISA “turn[ed] what
appeared to be a legislative blessing into a political curse”).
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lobbyists’ response was well organized, swift, and emphatic. 21
The first serious congressional efforts at reform were initiated
after the Supreme Court’s decision in Pilot Life announced the
breadth of ERISA preemption. 22 In 1991, Senator Howard
Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) introduced a bill that would have saved
from preemption statutes and common law providing remedies for
the improper administration of benefit plans or claims
processing. 23 Senator Edward Kennedy was among the cosponsors. 24 Representative Howard Berman (D-Cal) introduced a
companion bill in the House of Representatives. 25 Representative
Berman explained that his bill was specifically intended to address
the Supreme Court’s decision in Pilot Life. 26
Lobbyists representing employers and even the tobacco
industry reacted strongly and negatively to the bills.
Representatives of the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM) wrote to congressional leaders, urging that the legislation
be defeated and arguing that the bills were “based on
unsubstantiated examples of problems” and emphasizing the
uniformity of ERISA law. 27 NAM is a lobbying organization with
documented ties to the tobacco industry. 28 The members of NAM

21. Curtis D. Rooney, The States, Congress, or the Courts: Who Will Be
First to Reform ERISA Remedies?, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 73, 75 (1998) (noting
that while “ERISA has been amended numerous times since its inception,
attempts to change the exclusive damages and preemption provisions have
met with considerable controversy”).
22. Pilot Life Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56-57 (1987).
23. See S. 794, 102d Cong. §§ 1 (1991) (addressing the issue of preemption
but also requiring the Secretary of Labor to conduct a study on ERISA and the
preemption of State laws).
24. Id.
25. H.R. 1602, 102d Cong. § 2 (1992).
26. Roger C. Siske & Joni L. Andrioff, Selected Topics in ERISA
Preemption, C758 ALI-ABA 45, 58 n.4 (1992). The text of the bill would have
amended ERISA as follows:
(ii) nothing in this title shall be construed to relieve or exempt any
insurance company or other insurer from any provision of the statutory
or common law of any State to the extent that such provision provides a
remedy against insurance companies or other insurers who, in the
administration of an employee benefit plan or in the processing of
insurance claims thereunder, engage in unfair insurance claims
practices in connection with such claims, except that nothing in this
clause shall be construed to relate to remedies against plan sponsors.
27. Letter from Randolph M. Hale of NAM (the National Association of
Manufacturers) to The Honorable Pat Williams, Chairman, LaborManagement Relations, Committee on Education and Labor (Sept. 25, 1991).
28. Letter from Eugene Hardy, Vice President of NAM, to Fred Panzer,
Vice President of NAM, noting that the CEO of R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
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were of course employers in their own right, and would have been
affected in that role by any change to ERISA preemption. At the
same time, however, the tobacco companies were pursuing a
strategy on labeling laws that consisted principally of a
preemption argument, specifically one that frequently analogized
to ERISA preemption. 29 Faced with this opposition, the ERISA
preemption bills did not pass.
The ERISA preemption reform movement came to the fore once
again in the mid to late 1990s. In 1996, President Clinton
established an Advisory Commission on Consumer Protection and
Quality in the Health Care Industry 30, which recommended a
Patient’s Bill of Rights that included avenues for grievances and
complaints. 31 The Commission’s final report to the President noted
the impact that improperly denied claims could have on patients’
health and economic conditions. 32 The commission reached no
agreement on an ERISA reform proposal, and no such proposal was
included in the commission’s recommendations. 33 The proposals did,
however, result in rulemaking that reformed the claims process for
ERISA plan participants and called for the disclosure of increased
levels of information to participants. 34 The focus, however, remained

International, Inc. and a Vice President of Philip Morris USA were serving on
the board of NAM (Oct. 12, 1979).
29. Memorandum from Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue to R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Company, Improving Our Preemption Position in Existing Cases
Through New Legislation (March 26, 1991) available at http://legacy.library
.ucsf.edu/tid/drl12a00/pdf?search=%22erisa%20preemption%20tobacco%22
(discussing definitions in ERISA statute and possible similar definitions that
could be adopted in tobacco-related legislation).
30. Exec. Order No. 13,713, 61 Fed. Reg. 47,659 (1996) available at www
.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=53292 (last visited Jan. 17, 2014).
31. The President’s Advisory Comm’n on Consumer Prot. and Quality in
the Health Care Indus., CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES,
(July 17, 1998), available at http://archive.ahrq.gov/hcqual/final/appenda.html.
32. The President’s Advisory Comm’n on Consumer Prot. and Quality in
the Health Care Indus., STRENGTHENING THE MARKET TO IMPROVE QUALITY,
(July 19, 1998), available at http://archive.ahrq.gov/hcqual/final/chap10.html
(explaining that harm results when, ‘‘inappropriate benefit coverage decisions
. . . impinge on or limit the delivery of necessary care.’’). The report goes on to
explain that a wrongful denial of coverage, ‘‘can lead to a delay in care or to a
decision to forgo care entirely.’’ Id. The report notes that, ‘‘even a small
number of mistakes . . . can have serious, costly, or fatal consequences,’’ such
as, “additional health expenses, increased disability, lost wages, and lost
productivity.’’ Id.
33. Rooney, supra note 21, at 102-03
34. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; Rules and
Regulations for Administrative and Enforcement; Claims Procedure, 63 Fed.
Reg. 48390 (Sept. 9, 1998) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2560); Proposed
Amendments to Summary Plan Description Regulations, 63 Fed. Reg. 48376
(Sept. 9, 1998) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2520).
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firmly on changes to the claims process rather than the addition of
remedies available to plan participants when the process failed.
The 105th Congress saw the introduction of multiple ERISA
reform proposals, all of which failed to gain the traction necessary
to become law. 35 Instead of taking indiscriminate aim at ERISA
preemption, these proposals reflected lessons learned from past
attempts and took a more nuanced tack. One significant
concession was the inclusion of provisions aimed at allaying some
of the employer lobby’s greatest concerns, which were liability for
negligent claims processing and the loss of ERISA’s uniformity. 36
Nevertheless, the employer lobby found none of the proposals
acceptable. Lobbyists lined up against the more comprehensive
legislation, which included an ERISA preemption reform
provision. 37 While the Norwood proposal contained a provision
that purported to shield employers from liability for medical
decisions, analysts and lobbyists argued over the effect that such a
provision would actually have, with some arguing that its
purported protections may not amount to much. 38 The “Patient
Protection Act” (H.R. 4250) that eventually passed in the House
contained no ERISA reform—and the 105th Congress adjourned
before passing any version at all of the Patient Protection Act. 39

35. H.R. 1415, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 644, 105th Cong. (1997).
36. H.R. 1749, 105th Cong. (1997) (creating a federal remedy rather than
simply removing ERISA preemption and permitting all state law remedies);
Heather Hutchinson, The Managed Care Accountability Act, 32 IND. L. REV.
1383, 1384 (1999).
37. Anne B. Allen, Employers Resist a Chilly PARCA, available at
www.thefreelibrary.com/Employers+resist+a+chilly+PARCA.-a020326714
(last visited Jan. 17, 2014) (“Associations that have been active in opposition
to PARCA include the Health Insurance Association of America, the National
Association of Manufacturers and the National Federation of Independent
Business. Look for RIMS to join these ranks soon, as it is in the process of
drafting a position paper opposing PARCA.”).
38. H.R. 2723, 106th Cong. at 100 (1999) (stating that employers would not
be held liable unless they, “exercise discretionary authority to make a decision
on a claim”); HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, LIABILITY OF
EMPLOYERS AND PLAN SPONSORS UNDER DINGELL-NORWOOD (H.R. 2723) AND
SHADEGG-COBURN (H.R. 2824) (1999) http://lobby.la.psu.edu/001_Managed_
Care_Reform/Organizational_Statements/HIAA/HIAA_Liability_of_Employers
_and_Plan_Sponsors_Under_Norwood-Dingell.htm (concluding that any
purported employer shield based on the absence of discretion was illusory);
Alyssa J. Rubin, Spurred by Public’s Complaints, Congress Offers ManagedCare Cures, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1997 http://articles.latimes.com/1997/oct/22
/news/mn-45433 (quoting Anthony Knettel, director of health policy for the
ERISA Industry Committee which represents Fortune 500 companies as
stating that, “The employer would have to look over the shoulder of the HMO
and would be liable for all the things that the insurer and the HMO have
control over”).
39. Rooney, supra note 21, at 103.
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Congress continued to debate patients’ rights and whether
ERISA preemption should be revised so as to permit lawsuits
against managed care organizations—some commentators describe
this debate as one of the “most contentious” health policy
debates. 40 Ted Kennedy in particular continued to take a
leadership role, as a longtime champion of health care reform
whose ideas shaped the ACA and most previous healthcare reform
legislation passed in the past two decades. 41
In these debates, Kennedy argued that ERISA preemption was
a fundamentally necessary piece of any attempt to reform ERISA.
In a 1998 Senate hearing, he framed the issue as one of fairness—
no other American industry is insulated from the damaged caused
by negligent decisions and actions; why should ERISA plans be
protected when their negligent decisions cause harm? 42
At the same hearing, Olena Berg, then Assistant Secretary
for the United States Department of Labor’s Pension and Welfare
Benefits Administration, predicted that while external review of
denied claims would improve plan participants’ lot, the procedural
enhancements would not remove the incentive to arbitrarily deny
claims, because so few plan participants ever access the appeal
processes. 43 She noted also the disproportionately small remedies

40. Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform:
Opportunities and Limits, LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM 1, 1, 13
(1999) available at www.law.georgetwon.edu/oneillinstitute/research/legalsolutions-in-health-reform/Papers/ERISA.pdf (noting that “the preemption
provisions of [ERISA] will play a major role in determining the contours of any
health reform initiative[,]” and predicting, “considerable congressional
opposition” to any proposal that would weaken ERISA preemption). The
commentator goes on to outline one possible amelioration of ERISA
preemption—a regulatory revision of the term “benefit” to include reasonable
economic and noneconomic damages. Id. at 4.
41. Barry R. Furrow, Health Reform and Ted Kennedy: The Art of Politics .
. . and Persistence, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 445, 447 (2011) (noting
that the ACA, “bears the indelible mark of Senator Edward Kennedy, who
acted for forty years as a strong tailwind, pursuing health care reform forward
and making contributions to insurance reform through HIPAA and the
Massachusetts health reforms, which provided a partial template for the final
version of the ACA”).
42. See Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 3 (stating “every other industry
in American can be held responsible for its actions. Health plan decisions can
truly mean life or death, and they do not deserve immunity”).
43. Id. at 7. “[P]lans can comply with procedural requirements, they can
meet all of those, and still arbitrarily deny claims. Now, external review might
take care of a large part of that, but many participants, we know, never
question that initial determination. They never go into the appeals process.
They just assume that that determination was properly made . . . if the only
consequence for plans that engage in this kind of practice . . . is paying the
benefit they would have had to pay in the first place, they have no reason to do
the right thing and strong economic reasons for denying valid claims.” Id.
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that can result from ERISA preemption. 44 While expanded
internal and external review of claims decisions would be helpful,
these changes, without more, would not solve the problem of
wrongfully denied claims or the financial incentives to delay and
deny claims. 45 She noted the enduring issue of self-interested
decision-making 46 and the fact that some wrongful denials would
result in economic harm. To shield plans from harm under these
circumstances, she argued, is to make ERISA an anomaly in our
legal system. 47
Judges and commentators too called for ERISA preemption
reform, as they dismissed without a remedy cases in which
beneficiaries were denied their contracted benefits and suffered
serious harms. 48 Commentators believed that the time had come
for healthcare reform and revisions to ERISA’s harsh preemption
provision. 49
The 107th Congress was scheduled to debate the “Bipartisan
Patient Protection Act” when it returned from its August recess in

44. See id. at 43 (noting that if the failure to approve a necessary CAT scan
results in the plan participant becoming disabled, the remedy under ERISA is
the cost of the test that she should have received in the first place).
45. Id.
46. See id. at 11 (explaining “Procedural rights, even when honored, cannot
eliminate negligent or self-interested decision making by those determining
whether claimed coverage has been promised by the plan”).
47. See id. (noting that “[i]n other contexts throughout our legal system,
foreseeable injuries caused by a failure to deliver what has been promised
must be compensated”).
48. See, e.g., Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D.
Mass. 1997) (dismissing claims based on an incorrect denial of benefits that
led to the beneficiary’s death; calling ERISA preemption “a shield of immunity
that protects health insurers, utilization review providers, and other managed
care entities from potential liability for the consequences of their wrongful
denial of health benefits”); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 943
(6th Cir. 1995) (stating “one consequence of ERISA preemption, therefore, is
that plan beneficiaries or participants, bringing certain types of state
actions—such as wrongful death—may be left without a meaningful remedy”);
Turner v. Fallon Cmty. Health Plan, 953 F. Supp. 419, 424 (D. Mass. 1997)
(finding “an unfortunate consequence of ERISA preemption is, therefore, that
plan beneficiaries or participants who bring certain kinds of state actions, e.g.,
wrongful death, may be left without a meaningful remedy . . . Sadly, the case
at bar compels a like result”). “Plaintiff’s state common law claims are
preempted by the broadly sweeping arm of ERISA.” Id. “Plaintiff is left
without any meaningful remedy even if he were to establish that [the insurer]
wrongfully refused to provide the [bone marrow transplant] his wife urgently
sought.” Id.; Paul M. Secunda, Sorry, No Remedy: Intersectionality and the
Grand Irony of ERISA, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 131, 135 (2009) (calling for
legislative reform of ERISA’s denial of remedies).
49. See Havighurst supra note 21 (noting the “public backlash” against
managed care and noting that “[g]iven this environment, the time has come
for both managed care reform and ERISA reform”).
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2001; there was a consensus that some version of the bill would
pass. 50 ERISA reform failed again, however, after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, took the national agenda in a completely
different direction: national security became the most urgent
issue, and ERISA reform once again fell to one side. 51
Even state waivers from ERISA preemption could not succeed
in Congress. In 2007, certain states sought ERISA waivers from
Congress so health care reform could be attempted in the states. 52
At hearings over the issue, employer lobbying groups such as The
National Business Coalition on Health, the American Benefits
Council, and the ERISA Industry Committee argued that
preemption should remain in place. 53 These groups lobbied
actively on behalf of business interests, appearing again during
the healthcare reform debate of 2009 and following. 54 With regard
to ERISA waivers, the ERISA reform efforts were unsuccessful,
once again resulting in maintenance of the ERISA status quo. 55

50. Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, Drawing Lines in Shifting Sands: The U.S.
Supreme Court’s Mixed Messages on ERISA Preemption Imperil Health Care
Reform, 36 J. LEGIS. 91, 136 (2010).
51. See id. at 136 (explaining that “[w]hat soon became clear is that no part
of the bill could survive the September 11, 2001 attacks. At that point, matters
of national security became all consuming, patients’ rights toppled from the
legislature’s agenda and, as described earlier, Pegram’s promise of available
state remedies evaporated with Davila’s resuscitation of broad ERISA
preemption”); see also The Business of Congress After September 11, 2001, THE
BOOKINGS INSTITUTION POLICY DIALOGUE 2 available at www.brookings.edu
/~/media/research/files/papers/2002/1/01politics%20binder/pd01.pdf
(herein
The Business of Congress After September 11, 2001) (last visited Dec. 15, 2013)
(noting that security measures took precedence in a bipartisan effort following
September 11, 2001).
52. The Business of Congress After September 11, 2001, supra note 51, at
132.
53. Martin G. Resier, The U.S. House of Representatives Energy and
Commerce Committee Subcomittee on Health, National Coalition on Benefits 4
(June 25, 2009) available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites
/default/files/documents/Testimony-Reiser-HE-Comprehensive-Health-ReformDiscussion-Draft-2009-6-25.pdf.
54. Infra note 65.
55. Hawaii is the one state to have obtained an ERISA exemption. See The
Hawaii Uninsured Project Policy Brief, A Historical Overview of Hawaii’s
Prepaid Health Care Act 5, available at www.healthcoveragehawaii.org/pdf
/PHCA%20Historical%20Brief.pdf (explaining ERISA would have preempted
Hawaii’s Prepaid Health Care Act, but Hawaii’s congressional delegation
sought and obtained an ERISA waiver). The provision reads as follows: “(B)
Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall be construed to exempt from subsection (a)
of this section - (ii) any amendment of the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act
enacted after September 2, 1974, to the extent it provides for more than the
effective administration of such Act as in effect on such date.” Id. The ERISA
exemption applies only to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act as enacted on
September 2, 1974, and prohibits any substantive changes to the PHCA. Id.
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Thus, a long line of ERISA preemption reform efforts failed
one after another, prompting some commentators to question the
purpose of the repeated efforts. Some have speculated that such
issues are undertaken because they make for good posturing as
well as steady sources of campaign funds. 56

B. A Fizzling ERISA Reform Movement
In the debates leading up to passage of the ACA, ERISA
preemption reform proposals appeared multiple times. They were
quickly rejected, however, again due to strong business
opposition. 57 Indeed, the attempts at ERISA preemption reform
did not appear as a principal objective of the reform effort, to the
point that some have described ERISA reform as having effectively
been dropped from the legislative “wish list.” 58
Still, in late 2009, ERISA preemption was once again part of
the healthcare reform discussion. The larger healthcare reform bill
did not contain a provision addressing any reform of ERISA
preemption. 59 Nonetheless, two separate bills were introduced that
would have done just that. One, H.R. 3925, introduced by Jim
McDermott (D-WA), would have precluded preemption of State
causes of action “relating to the denial of a claim for benefits under

56. See Havighurst, supra note 20, at n. 70 (noting that “Congress has been
more eager to entertain legislative proposals than to pass them, perhaps
because supporters find the issue a good one on which to posture and because
both sides find it a lucrative source of campaign contributions”).
57. See Heather T. Williams, Fighting Fire with Fire: Reforming the Health
Care System Through a Market-Based Approach to Medical Tourism, 89 N.C.
L. REV. 607, 660 (Jan. 2011) (voicing that the healthcare industry has a
significant and well-funded lobbying presence in Washington, D.C.); see Dan
Eggen, Health Sector Has Donated Millions to Lawmakers, WASH. POST, Mar.
8, 2009, at A9, available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2009/03/07/AR2009030701748.html (recognizing that “[t]he health-care sector
has long ranked with financial services and energy interests as one of the most
powerful political forces in Washington, and it spent nearly $1 billion on
lobbying in the past two years alone”); see also David D. Kirkpatrick, At State
Level, Health Lobby Fights Change, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2009, at A1 (detailing
the efforts of health care industry lobbyists to affect health care reform at the
state level). See Robert Steinbrook, Election 2008—Campaign Contributions,
Lobbying, and the U.S. Health Sector, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 736, 736-38
(2007) (describing election contributions and lobbying resources of the health
care sector).
58. See Chirba-Martin, supra note 8, at 136 (expressing “it has taken eight
years for health care to reemerge as a domestic priority, but fixing ERISA is
no longer on the legislative wish-list”).
59. See H.R. 111th Cong. 3200 §151(a)(2) (1999) (presenting “nothing in
paragraph (1) shall be construed as affecting the application of section 514 of
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974”), available at
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-111hr3200ih/pdf/BILLS-111hr3200ih.pdf.
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a health care plan.” 60 The other attempt, known as the Shadegg
Amendment, would have permitted state lawsuits against ERISA
plans. 61
Lobbyists’ reaction to these proposals was swift and strongly
negative, advancing basically the same objections that had been
voiced in the past. 62 The business community continued to
emphasize ERISA’s more uniform rules and (with a marked lack of
empirical support) the cost increases that could occur if employers
were subject to the full panoply of state remedies. 63 The American
Benefits Council, for example, said the amendment would expose
employers to “potentially ruinous exposure to liability” and would
result in “fewer employers being willing to sponsor health benefits
for employees.” 64 Other groups echoed these sentiments. 65
Business interests nationwide made the preservation of ERISA
preemption a high priority, bombarding congressional leaders with
position papers and arguments against the reform of ERISA
preemption. 66 Many of these communications were signed by some
of the most prominent companies in America. 67

60. H.R. 111th Cong. 3925, 1 (Oct. 26, 2009) available at www.americanbe
nefitscouncil.org/documents/hr_3925_111th.pdf.
61. Shadegg Amendment to H.R. 3962 available at http://housedocs.house
.gov/rules/3962/Shadegg3962_198.pdf.
62. Shadegg Amendment Would Increase Litigation, Health Costs and
Leave Employers Vulnerable, AMERICAN BENEFITS COUNSEL 1-2 (Nov. 4, 1999)
available at www.americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents/hcr_erisa_shadegganalysis110409.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2013).
63. Id. Similar to lobbying materials in past debates over the costs and
benefits of reforming ERISA preemption, these lobbying materials do not
include any back-up for the position that arguments regarding increased costs
and the benefits of uniformity. Id.
64. Id.
65. National Coalition on Benefits Press Release, Statement from National
Coalition on Benefits on Shadegg’s ERISA Proposal (Nov. 5, 2009), available at
www.coalitio nonbenefits.org/media/pdf/NCB_Shadegg_Response_110509.pdf.
The press release notes “strong opposition” to the amendment and states that
the amendment would “crumble the health care coverage that 177 million
Americans have today . . . [t]he proposal threatens to erode the flexibility of
ERISA—the cornerstone of employer-based coverage—resulting in a more
costly, more litigious health care system that will drive employers away from
voluntarily providing benefits.” Id.
66. Letter from Karen Ignagni, President and Chief Executive Officer of
America’s Health Insurance Plans to Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and
House Republican Leader John Boehner (Nov. 5, 2009).
67. Letter to President Barack Obama from American companies including
American Airlines, Best Buy, Dollar General, Boeing, Eastman Kodak, available
at
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/sites/default/files/documents
/Testimony-Reiser-HE-Comprehensive-Health-Reform-Discussion-Draft-2009-625.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2014); see also Testimony of Martin G. Reiser,
Chairman of the National Coalition on Benefits, before the U.S. House of
Representatives Energy and Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Health
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Even without ERISA preemption reform, passage of the ACA
was far from certain. Early in President Obama's effort to reform
health care, the Obama team set out some rules to ensure that the
reform effort did not meet the same end as President Clinton's
1993-94 attempt. 68 One guiding rule was that opposition should be
neutralized rather than defeated. 69 The Obama team would seek
ways to work with the various industries and interests that had
made short work of the Clinton health care initiative. 70 The team
used this approach to work with the large pharmaceutical
companies and with the insurance interests. 71 Even with this
approach, the vote was a close one, with House Speaker Nancy
Pelosi working vote by vote to negotiate support for the ACA,
quelling uprisings from various factions of the Democratic party. 72
In this context then, it is not surprising that so controversial an
issue as ERISA preemption—that would have raised the ire of so
many employers and insurers—was not championed.
In the end, ERISA preemption was left out of the ACA. In
place of preemption reform, the ACA offers procedural refinements
and rules; the most significant of these are enhanced internal
review and claims regulations, together with mandatory
availability of external review.
While these revisions to ERISA are not insignificant, they
show that the ERISA preemption reform movement has made very
little progress since Ted Kennedy’s senate hearing in 1998. At that
hearing, industry and employer representatives urged that instead
of reforming ERISA preemption, Congress should instead reform
the internal claims procedures and provide for mandatory external
review. 73 Industry representatives stopped short of agreeing to

(June 25, 2009), available at http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov
/sites/default/files/documents/Testimony-Reiser-HE-Comprehensive-HealthReform-Discussion-Draft-2009-6-25.pdf (urging that ERISA preemption remain
intact and that employers be permitted to retain the existing “flexibility” that
ERISA provides). The National Coalition on Benefits counts some of America’s
largest companies among its members. Membership, NATIONAL COALITION ON
BENEFITS,. www.coalitiononbenefits.org/Membership/ (listing companies such as
Wal-Mart, Nike, Food Lion, and many others).
68. Staff of the Washington Post, supra note 4, at 15.
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 30.
73. See Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 15 (specializing in employee
benefits law, Mr. Robert Gallagher, of Groom & Nordberg, a Washington, DC
firm, urged that the repeal of ERISA preemption would be “disastrous” for
ERISA healthcare plans). He argued if ERISA preemption were repealed,
employers would scale back benefits. Id. Another industry representative,
Mark A. Smith, employee benefits compliance manager at AMP, said that
even though external review might present problems, it was preferable to
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these reforms on the spot, but voiced enthusiasm for that type of
reform. 74 In the end, the ACA featured claims processing reform of
exactly the sort that industry representatives outlined in the 1998
hearings, of the sort long known to be acceptable to employer
groups, and of the sort that Ted Kennedy and others had said
would be wholly inadequate to address the power imbalance in
ERISA claims processing.

III.

REFORMING ERISA AT THE MARGINS

In place of more sweeping ERISA preemption reform, the
ACA offers procedural reform only. The goal of these regulations is
not to provide any sort of remedy if participants suffer from
negligent plan decision-making, or if plans do not follow the
processes outlined in the regulations. 75 Instead, the regulations
aim to make external review processes mandatory and more
uniform, to make claims processes more structured, and to
improve the extent to which benefits actually provided conform to
the plan terms. 76 The focus is strictly on improving the process

reform ERISA remedies:
Mr. Smith: I cannot speak on behalf of NAM, but at AMP we have been
involved in developing policy statements, where, as an alternative to
changing some of these ERISA remedies, we would certainly favor some
type of an appeal process to help resolve some of these issues.
Senator Specter: How about external appeal?
Mr. Smith: Under the right circumstances. That is fraught with certain
difficulties, as well. But it is something we would certainly prefer to
some of the ERISA remedy changes.
Id. at 46.
74. Id.
75. Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Insurance
Issuers, 75 Fed. Reg. 43341 (July 23, 2010). The federal regulation states that
“[t]his guidance is intended to ensure that plan participants and beneficiaries
are promptly accorded the important protections under the [ACA] that provide
for fuller and fairer processing of claims, the right to appeal claims that are
denied, and the right to obtain effective external review of claims on appeal.”
Id.
76. Id. The regulations are also intended to provide benefits that might
otherwise have been improperly denied, and to provide greater “certainty and
consistency” in the handling of benefit claims and appeals and “improved
access to information about the manner in which claims and appeals are
adjudicated,” potentially leading to greater efficiency in the system. Id. While
the regulations’ stated goals note that improper denials and delays can cause
“substantial harm,” the regulations note that their goal is to reduce such
improper denials, not provide any remedy for the harm suffered. Id. See also
Roy F. Harmon, An Assessment of New Appeals and External Review
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and adding more steps—each step represents an opportunity to
correct an incorrect decision. Each of the steps requires, however,
a participant’s wherewithal, organizational skills, and advocacy.

A. The ACA’s Amendments to ERISA’s Claims
Processing Procedures
The ACA’s revisions to ERISA’s claims processing procedures
bring new structure and standards, as well as an external review
feature.
1. Revisions to Claims Processing Procedures
Even before the ACA, ERISA called for benefit plans to
provide a “full and fair review” to participants whose claims for
benefits are denied. 77 In 2000, the Department of Labor added the
requirement that ERISA plans establish “reasonable” claims
procedures, notification of decisions, and a manner of appeal. 78
The new rules developed under the ACA provide additional
structure and specifics for initial claims determinations and any
subsequent reviews, as well as procedural enhancements
regarding access to the claims file, relevant diagnostic codes, and
other information. 79
Claimants have access to more information under the new
rules. Plans must let claimants review the claims file and present
evidence and testimony in the appeals process. 80 The plan must

Processes—ERISA Claimants Get “Some Kind of Hearing,” 56 S.D. L. REV. 408
(2011) (providing an assessment of whether the reforms are likely to achieve
these goals).
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1133 (1974). Every benefit plan must “provide adequate
notice in writing to [any] participant or beneficiary whose claims for benefits
under the plan has been denied, setting forth the specific reasons for such
denial, written in a manner calculated to be understood by the participant,”
and to “afford a reasonable opportunity to any participant whose claim for
benefits has been denied for a full and fair review by the appropriate named
fiduciary of the decision denying the claim.” Id.
78. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 65 Fed. Reg. 70265
(Nov. 21, 2000).
79. See 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719T (2011) (allowing the Secretaries of the
Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Labor, and the Department of
Health and Human Services to set out the external review process through a
series of rules and technical releases); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2719T (temporary
regulations that expire on July 22, 2013, according to § 54.9815-2719T(h));
§ 2590.715-2719 (“interim final regulations” with no stated expiration date;
Department of Labor Technical Releases; Affordable Care Act Implementation
FAQs (Part 1), FAQs-1,-8, and -9, at www.dol.gov/ebsa/faqs.
80. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719 (b)(2)(ii)(C) (2013) (stating that “[a] plan
and issuer must allow a claimant to review the claim file and to present
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also give the claimant any new rationale for issuing an adverse
claims decision on appeal, giving the claimant sufficient time to
respond before the decision is issued. 81 The plan is required to
provide any new or additional evidence that the plan used in
connection with the appeal. 82
Independence and impartiality of the decision-maker are also
addressed. The plan must ensure that the adjudication of claims
and appeals is performed in a manner designed to promote
independence and impartiality, meaning that promotions and
compensation cannot be based on a claims processor’s record of
denying claims. 83
Before the new rules, plans that ignored claims processing
rules faced few consequences; the new rules try to change that.
Now, if a plan fails to conduct timely appeals or does not adhere to
the claims processing guidelines, administrative remedies are
deemed exhausted and a plan participant may seek external
review. 84 In addition, if the claimant opts to go straight to court,
the plan cannot benefit from the deference afforded a decision
made by a fiduciary with discretion 85; under these circumstances,
the claim or appeal is deemed denied on review “without the
exercise of discretion by an appropriate fiduciary.” 86
Given the low percentage of claims that are appealed or the
even smaller number that are appealed externally, it is unclear
how significant a disincentive this would be. 87 That is, if few
claimants are using the appeals avenues available to them, it is
not clear how many will seek this more aggressive avenue or even
know that it exists.
Furthermore, the strict compliance rule has been softened

evidence and testimony as part of the internal claims and appeals process”).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(D) (2011) (explaining that “[t]he
plan and issuer must ensure that all claims and appeals are adjudicated in a
manner designed to ensure the independence and impartiality of the persons
involved in making the decision [and] accordingly, decisions regarding hiring,
compensation, termination, promotion, or other similar matters with respect
to any individual (such as a claims adjudicator or medical expert) must not be
made based upon the likelihood that the individual will support the denial of
benefits”).
84. Id. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(F)(1).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See infra note 113 and accompanying text (explaining that 60% of plan
participants facing a problem with claims processing do not contact their
plans, even if the problem will cost them more than $1,000; the vast majority
of denied claims are not appealed, and only a miniscule percentage reach
external review (only one, for example, in Connecticut’s state-run program in
2012)).
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from its original version. While the July 2010 rules provided this
consequence for even de minimis departures from the claims
processing rules, that stance quickly changed. After insurance
companies and plan sponsors reacted negatively to the rule of
strict compliance, the departments relented, instead opting to
excuse those errors that are (1) de minimis, (2) non-prejudicial, (3)
attributable to good cause or matters beyond the plan’s or issuer’s
control, (4) in the context of an ongoing good faith exchange of
information, and (5) not reflective of a pattern or practice of noncompliance. 88
The new rules also mandate continued coverage during the
appeals process—if a denial involves the reduction or ending of
treatment, the treatment must continue during the appeal’s
pendency. 89 In addition, notices must be given in a culturally and
linguistically appropriate manner, 90 and diagnosis and treatment
codes must be disclosed upon request. 91
2. External Review
The ACA amends ERISA’s claims processing procedures to
add an additional and binding external review by an independent
review organization (IRO). 92 Plans must “implement an effective
external review process that meets minimum standards
established by the Secretary.” 93 The rules set out a safe harbor
provision that provides specific guidelines that, if followed, will
shield a plan from enforcement action on the external review
issue. According to the safe harbor provision, plans must assign
external reviews to an IRO accredited by URAC (Utilization
Review Accreditation Commission) or by another national
accrediting organization. 94 Plans must contract with three IROs
and rotate assignments among them. 95
Initially, the scope of decisions to which the external review
procedure would apply was broad, applying to any adverse benefit
decision except those based on lack of eligibility to participate in
the plan. 96 Less than a year later, a temporary rule narrowed that

88. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(F)(2).
89. Id. at § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(iii).
90. Id. at § 2590.715-2719(e).
91. Id. at § 2590.715-2719(b)(2)(ii)(E)(2).
92. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2719, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg19 (2010) (amending the Public Health Service Act, and incorporated by
reference into ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1133).
93. Id.
94. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-1, at 2, 4 (2010).
95. Id. at 4.
96. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 54.9815-2719T(a)(2) (2010) (adopting the
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scope, so that now only the following types of decisions are
included: those decisions concerning (1) medical judgment (except
those involving contractual or legal interpretation without medical
judgment), or (2) a rescission of coverage. 97
With regard to the standard of review, independent review
organizations are not to give the denial any deference—the review
for each externally reviewed claim is de novo. 98 Some health
insurers, governmental officials and commentators have greeted
the external review provision enthusiastically, 99 while some
commentators have questioned whether external review will mean
much to most plan participants. 100 Thus, while the ACA reforms
claims processing at the margins and adds external review, ERISA
preemption remains intact so that plan participants with denied

definition of “adverse benefit determination” as stated in 29 C.F.R. § 2560-5031(m)(iii)(4)).
The term “adverse benefit determination” means any of the following: a
denial, reduction, or termination of, or a failure to provide or make
payment (in whole or in part) for, a benefit, including any such denial,
reduction, termination, or failure to provide or make payment that is
based on a determination of a participant's or beneficiary's eligibility to
participate in a plan, and including, with respect to group health plans,
a denial, reduction, or termination of, or a failure to provide or make
payment (in whole or in part) for, a benefit resulting from the
application of any utilization review, as well as a failure to cover an item
or service for which benefits are otherwise provided because it is
determined to be experimental or investigational or not medically
necessary or appropriate.
29 C.F.R. § 2560-503-1(m)(iii)(4) (2001).
97. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2179(d)(1)(ii)(A)-(B).
98. TECHNICAL RELEASE NO. 2010-1, at 3-7.
99. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor Press Office, Administration
Announces New Affordable Care Act Measures to Protect Consumers and Put
Patients Back in Charge of Their Care: New Regulations Give Patients Right
to Appeal Health Plan Decisions; New Grants Program Strengthens State and
Territory Consumer Assistance Programs (July 22, 2010), available at
www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/2010/ebsa072210.html (last visited Mar. 17,
2014) (stating that the new rules would help end “some of the worst insurance
company abuses”); Dustin D. Berger, The Management of Health Care Costs:
Independent Medical Review After “Obamacare”, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 288
(Winter 2011) (noting the “consensus seems to be that [independent medical
review] is a critical consumer protection against faulty or biased MCO denials
of care” and observing that “[independent medical review] may even legitimize
the process of utilization review because it ensures that consumers can resort
to an independent and unbiased medical appeal”).
100. See Harmon, supra note 76, at 409 (suggesting that “on balance,
however, the inconsistency and complexity of the new rules, the historic
underutilization of external review, and disparity in legal and medical
resources between participants and plan administrators leave substantial
doubt as to the advantages claimed for the new procedures”).
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claims must work tirelessly and with exacting attention to detail
in order to appeal and eventually win back—at most—the value of
the denied or delayed claim.

B. Claims Processing and the Individual Claimant
The new rules embrace process over remedy, pitting wellfinanced repeat players against the sick and usually
unrepresented plan participant. The ACA adds external claims
review to the existing internal appeals; yet given the burdens and
multiple claims that illness often brings, the path to eventual
external review becomes a war of attrition between unevenlymatched opponents. The new process is marked by multiple steps
and an absence of incentives for attorneys to participate, meaning
that only the most energetic and sophisticated individuals are
likely to pursue multiple levels of appeal to their conclusion. And,
the human tendency to remain with a default option works in the
plan’s favor—once a claim is denied, for any reason, it is up to the
plan participant to shift the momentum.
1. The Allure of the Default Option
Significantly, to take advantage of the full benefit of the new
rules, a plan participant must have time and energy to resist the
default stance of denial and initiate an appeal. Time and energy
are of course resources in short supply for those suffering from
illness.
If a claim is denied improperly 101 the onus shifts to the plan
participant to marshal evidence and take action. As an initial step,
the plan participant must first overcome the general human
tendency to remain with the default option, even where the default
option is not the most beneficial. 102 The default or status quo is

101. The number of denied claims is difficult to measure, but estimates
place the denial rate at approximately 3.8 percent of all claims filed. Frank B.
Cohen, Denials & Appeals Survey, (Mar. 22, 2010), www.crnhealthcare.com
/downloads/Denials-and-Appeals-Survey-3-2010.pdf (last visited Mar. 17,
2014); physicians report that they lose money because claims are not paid
accurately. Barry Shatzman, How Medical Practices Can Reclaim Lost
Revenue From Denials, MEDICAL BILLING BLOG, (June 27, 2012, 11:26 AM),
www.mbrbilling.com/blog/bid/129876/How-Medical-Practices-Can-Reclaim-LostRevenue-From-Denials (last visited Mar. 17, 2014).
102. See CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 34-35 (2009) (noting
that people tend to remain with the default option in such diverse areas as
seating in a classroom, asset allocation in a retirement plan, beneficiary
selection in a retirement plan, selection of television program, in that they
tend to select the program that follows the one they initially chose, and even
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powerfully attractive, and this human tendency is readily
exploited. The status quo bias can be observed in a multitude of
different settings: as a recent exploration of choice architecture
points out, the individuals in charge of magazine circulation, for
example, likely know that if a person must contact the magazine
or pick up the telephone to cancel a subscription that will
otherwise renew automatically, the person will probably keep the
subscription in place. 103
The reasons people tend to select the default choice are
numerous, and apply with even greater force to individuals who
are ill or who are caring for someone ill. One reason is
inattention—individuals might intend to select a different option,
but they never get around to it. 104
In addition, the framing of the available options affects the
choices that individuals make. 105 In particular, the default option
may come with an implied endorsement from the entity setting the
default. 106 This is certainly the case with health plan decisions,
which often include the words “your responsibility” or similar
language that suggests a final or even moral responsibility to pay
the amount that the plan has determined is the participant’s
appropriate share. 107
Not only is this general default pressure at play with denied
ERISA claims, but Americans with denied healthcare claims face
additional and numerous pressures that render them even more
likely to stay with the default than the average healthy person.
The pressures facing health plan participants include the
following:
•

Difficulty in deciphering and understanding copious
medical bills. A recent report explores case study after case
study of individuals who were inundated with medical bills

receipt of a magazine subscription that they never read).
103. Id. at 56.
104. Id.
105. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions
and the Psychology of Choice, 221 SCIENCE 453, 458 (1981), available at
www.jstor.org/stable/1685855 (noting that “the susceptibility of preferences to
variations of framing raises doubt about the feasibility and adequacy of the
coherence criterion” that the authors had adopted).
106. Id.
107. See Blue Cross of California, How to Read Your Explanation of
Benefits (Aug. 2000), available at http://w2.anthem.com/clients/uofc/How%
20to%20read%20your%20EOB.pdf. (using as an example a Blue Cross of
California document depicting an EOB which shows a box with an amount of
money that states, “It is your responsibility to pay,” rather than “amount due”
or “our determination”). This framing of the decision makes a difference to
individuals’ perception of the correctness of the decision and whether it should
be appealed.
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and unable to sort them out or appeal those that were
improperly denied, particularly because the individuals
were ill or caring for someone who was ill. 108
•

High number of different medical bills and claims. The
sheer number of medical bills generated by a serious illness
can be overwhelming. 109 Even a single surgery can generate
bills—and hence, claims—from numerous sources, such as
the physician, radiologist, anesthesiologist, laboratory, and
so on. 110 If an illness is protracted, the bills and claims
multiply even further. So if the general tendency is to
remain with a default due to inattention, the person with a
denied healthcare claim has even greater difficulty paying
attention to a multitude of claims, sorting through the
reasons for any denial, and taking time to advocate for a
reversal.

•

Inability to advocate. Patients and their caregivers often
lack the ability to advocate for themselves, due to the
pressure of illness and other strains brought on by
illness. 111

•

Reluctance to contact health plan. Individuals facing
disputes with their health plans tend not to even contact
their plan to resolve problems; when they try to resolve a
claim denial or other problem, most people facing such a
problem had to attempt a resolution for a month or longer,

108. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MEDICAL DEBT
AMONG PEOPLE WITH HEALTH INSURANCE 29-30 (Jan. 2014) available at
http://kff.org/private-insurance/report/medical-debt-among-people-with-healthinsurance/ (explaining one case study, where a parent of a child with autism
had numerous claims for autism treatment denied, although she had no idea
why). A teacher who was the subject of another case study had to pay for a
mammogram, even though that preventive procedure was in fact covered at
100%; she was not aware that she could appeal that decision or that her state
had a Consumer Assistance Program that would have helped her appeal. Id.
at 23. Another case study focused on a medical transcriptionist who had an
ambulance claim denied, even though another had been paid. Id. She said it
did not occur to her to appeal the claim, and said that she would not have had
time to do so even if she had known about the possibility. Id.
109. See id. at 14 (discussing how one individual in the study received 125
different medical bills over a four-month period). See generally id. at 22-36
(stating many of the individuals studied as part of the report found that the
high number of medical bills made the process of assessing and paying the
bills difficult).
110. Id. at 22-36.
111. See id. at 13-14 (finding “[m]ost others interviewed were not able to
effectively track bills and resolve mistakes, including Gwen, who “works in the
health care industry and considers herself knowledgeable about health
claims”). Yet, “[B]etween caring for her frail husband and working full time as
the sole breadwinner, she simply couldn’t manage.” Id. at 14.
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or they were simply unable to resolve it at all. 112 Even
when denials or other problems generate out-of-pocket costs
exceeding $1,000 or resulted in a serious decline in health,
sixty percent of individuals did not contact their health
insurance plan to resolve the problem. 113

Because of these and other pressures, it is scarcely surprising
that claimants drop out of the internal and external appeals
process in large percentages, at each successive level of appeal. 114
As the ACA’s new rules took shape and the departments accepted
public comments on proposed rules, industry commentators
pushed the burden of action always further onto claimants, with
the default option favoring the plans. Initially, the new rules
required strict adherence to the claims processing procedures, but
that has been watered down, and the burden of action and proof
once again placed squarely on the plan participant. Initially, even
a de minimis violation of the claims processing rules would have
allowed a plan participant to short-circuit the claims process and
proceed directly to external or judicial review. 115 In the public
comment period following the proposal, however, industry
representatives expressed vehement opposition, arguing that
many plan participants would be permitted to bypass internal
review and go straight to external review or litigation, which, the
employer and industry representatives argued, would raise the
costs for all participants. 116 Numerous entities commented on

112. Id. at 14.
113. Id.
114. See Between You and Your Doctor: The Private Health Insurance
Bureaucracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Policy, 111th Cong.
46 (2009) (statement of Patricia Farrell, Senior Vice President, Aetna Inc.)
(finding “[i]n 2008 only a small percentage of claims generated an appeal or a
complaint.”); Advocacy for Patients with Chronic Illness, Inc., How to File
Insurance Appeals, www.advocacyforpatients.org/hifile.html (last visited on
Mar. 3, 2014) (stating that 94% of denials are never appealed). See, e.g.,
Caroline E. Mayer, The Claim Game: Here’s How to Fight Back When Your
Insurance Company Denies a Claim, AARP, Nov. 2009, at 30 (citing
Connecticut’s healthcare advocate Kevin Lembo as stating that 96% of denials
are not appealed). See also Connecticut General Life Insurance Company,
Addendum to Health Insurer Annual Statement 2012 Annual Statement, Vt.
Dep’t of Fin. Regulation 2-3, available at www.dfr.vermont.gov/sites/default
/files/CIGNA%20S200%20Report.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (reporting
that out of 152,492 medical claims in 2012, of which 3,367 (2.2%) were denied
such that members were directly impacted (defined as denials due to reasons
other than “contractual obligations or other contractual or administrative
requirements”)). With regard to post-service appeals, there were 37 first-level
appeals, 5 second-level appeals, and just one external appeal. Id. at 4.
115. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719, supra note 80, at (b)(2)(ii)(F).
116. See Letter from Kathryn Wilber, Senior Counsel, Health Policy,
American Benefits Council, to Office of Health Plan Standards and
Compliance Assistance, Employee Benefits Security Administration 5-6 (Sept.
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behalf of consumers, but the lengthy legal analysis was for the
most part contributed by industry giants such as the American
Benefits Council and UnitedHealth Group. 117
The departments relented, and the rule now does not apply if
the exception is (1) de minimis, (2) non-prejudicial, (3) attributable
to good cause or matters beyond the plan’s control, (4) in the
context of an ongoing good-faith exchange of information, and (5)
not reflective of a pattern or practice of non-compliance. 118 Upon
written request, a claimant can obtain the plan’s basis for its
position that the plan met this standard. 119
To overcome the plan-favoring default with regard to this
rule, then, the participant must recognize the plan’s departure
from the rules and be aware of the possibility of short-circuiting
the claims process. In addition, should the plan resist the shortcircuiting process by asserting the exception, the claimant would
need to know also about the option to submit a written request for
an explanation. Even if the claimant does take such a step, the
claimant is ill-equipped to know whether the plan is correct in
asserting that the claimant’s particular treatment is part of a
“pattern or practice of non-compliance.” This information would be
hard to come by without having discovery into the plan’s practices
or being part of some sort of claimant group.
In a similar retreat, the departments backed away from the

30, 2010) www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB45-0088.pdf (quoting an example of
the opposition). The letter in pertinent part states,“[w]e believe there is a
strong likelihood that the strict adherence standard will operate to allow many
claimants to essentially bypass internal appeals processes, which generally
provide claimants and plans with an efficient and cost-effective means for
timely resolution of disputed benefits claims. Such a rule is undesirable from a
policy perspective as it will permit individuals to initiate expensive external
review processes or file suit in Federal court, for appeals that could most
appropriately be resolved at the internal appeals level in a timely and costeffective manner. According to the Preamble to the Interim Final Rule, a
recent report found that the average cost of an external review was $605.
Increased plan costs are ultimately shouldered by participants as well, in the
form of higher employee contributions for coverage.” Id.
117. During the public comment periods, large industry players provided
the bulk of the close analysis; individuals and consumer groups weighed in
equal or greater numbers, but without the lengthy analyses provided by giants
such as UnitedHealth Group and U.S Chamber of Commerce. See, e.g., Email
from Terry Tryan, Employee Benefits Agency, to Employee Benefits Security
Administration (June 28, 2011) www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1-2719-IFR.pdf (quoting
a claims liaison through an agency who notes that many of his clients do not
understand the claim and appeal denials) He requests, “I would like to see
subscribers able to appeal their claims and understand the denials. The
language within an insurance company sometimes carries over in the
subscribers realm and they have no clue of what the carrier is saying.” Id.
118. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715.2719, supra note 80, at (b)(2)(ii)(F).
119. Id.
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new rules’ initial requirement that plans automatically provide
the diagnosis and treatment codes it used as part of an adverse
benefit determination. 120 The rules now provide that this
information is available upon the participant’s request, again
placing the burden of action upon the already-burdened plan
participant. 121
Thus, in terms of process, established principles of human
behavior such as framing and inertia continue to ensure that the
claims process flows always in the health plan’s favor and few
consumers question their assigned share of the costs. Once a claim
is denied, the default choice is always that the claim remains
denied. In practice, the default option of remaining denied is
exactly what happens with regard to the vast majority of denied
healthcare claims.
2. Unrepresented Claimant Versus Repeat Player
The appeals process pits individual plan participant against a
repeat player—the plan or its representative. With regard to
external review, even the decision-maker is a repeat player with a
business interest in an outcome favoring the plan.
Of the three parties involved in the appeals process
(participant, plan, and external reviewer), the individual
participant faces the greatest number of structural challenges.
First, the individual is most likely new to the claims and appeals
process, unlike the plan and external reviewer, who may face these
issues multiple times per day. Second, the participant will likely
be unrepresented by counsel. Even though the reform law is
replete with procedural requirements that even sophisticated
institutional players are still trying to assess, there are no
incentives for lawyers to represent claimants in the administrative
process. 122 And, even if a claimant reaches a federal court and

120. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, T.R. 2010-2, INTERIM PROCEDURES FOR
INTERNAL CLAIMS AND APPEALS UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (Sept. 20, 2010).
121. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers: Rules Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Process, 76 Fed. Reg.
37213, at 37231 (proposed June 24, 2011).
122. Attorney’s fees are not available for administrative action without
litigation, so the availability of attorney’s fees is no detriment at all to
administrators who would refuse to pay claims initially and then pay on
appeal or settle the claim as soon as litigation is initiated. See Parke v. First
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1011 (8th Cir. 2004) (joining
“the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits in holding that the term ‘any
action’ in 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) does not extend to pre-litigation
administrative proceedings”); Harmon, supra note 76, at 440 (noting that “[a]s
with prior law, the ERISA claimant’s attorney cannot obtain an award of
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wins the value of the denied claim, attorney’s fees for the
administrative phase are still generally unavailable. 123 Attorneys’
fees for the judicial phase may be granted but are far from a
certainty. 124 Therefore, the claimant must cope not only with the
burdens of being ill, but must also attempt to navigate—without
help—the complex ERISA rules.
Some free help is available, but many plan participants are
unaware of it. The ACA provides for Consumer Assistance Grants,
designed to provide claimants with additional information and
“assist [consumers] with filing complaints and appeals.” 125
Twenty-three states have put these programs into place; the rest
have not. 126 A Kaiser Family Foundation report notes, however,
that even in the states that have adopted them, the programs have
not been sufficiently funded. 127 Consumers outside states with
Citizens Assistance Programs can contact the Department of
Labor directly to request help. 128 The DOL will attempt to resolve
the dispute through informal settlement procedures. 129 In

attorneys’ fees and costs for these administrative proceedings”).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Graham, Quinn, and St. Joseph’s Hosp. supra note 9.
125. See Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance, Affordable Care Act
(ACA) Consumer Assistance Program Grants, https://www.cfda.gov/index?s=
program&mode=form&tab=step1&id=61fad740681f80f7baea3832a8a16fdbwww.
cfda.gov/?s=program%mode=form&tab=step1&id=61fad740681f80 (last visited
Jan. 29, 2014) (quoting the language out of the goal of the Consumer
Assistance Program Grants as charging recipients with collecting data on
consumer inquiries and complaints to “help the Secretary identify problems in
the marketplace and strengthen enforcement”). See also Funding
Opportunities, THE CENTER FOR CONSUMER INFORMATION, https://www.cms
.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Consumer-Assistance-Grants/ (last visited Jan. 29,
2014) (giving more information on states with assistance centers (and those
without)).
126. Id.
127. See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 108, at 21 (noting that
“the law authorizes ‘such sums as are necessary’ to support CAPs but only
appropriated $30 million”). No funding has been announced since 2012, even
though the CAPs “are the only entities required, by federal law, to help
privately insured people resolve health plan complaints and claims disputes
and file appeals. Absent this help, as case studies illustrate, some people may
continue to be overwhelmed by insurance paperwork they cannot understand
and even incur debt for bills insurance should have paid.”
128. Request for Assistance from the Dept. of Labor, available at
https://www.askebsa.dol.gov/WebIntake/Home.aspx (last accessed Mar. 15,
2014).
129. Id. The DOL offers the following assistance with disputes:
Requests for Assistance or Complaints involving alleged violations of
Title I of ERISA are handled by Benefit Advisors in our national and
field offices. Those who file complaints with us can expect a prompt and
courteous response from our staff. Every complaint received will be
pursued and, if determined to be valid, resolution will be sought through
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numerous instances studied in the recent Kaiser Family
Foundation report, individuals were unaware that there was
consumer assistance available to help them. 130 Ultimately, while
the repeat player has had years to parse the rules and refine its
approach, the individual claimant must forage for free help (if the
claimant is able to even know where to look) or proceed through
the process alone.
When an external reviewer decides a claim, can it be
impartial? The external reviewer is essentially a paid, private
company that arbitrates the matter. 131 Unlike a judge, the
external reviewer is paid by the party denying the claim. 132 The
rules provide that, to enhance the reviewer’s impartiality, the plan
must contract with at least three reviewers and rotate
assignments among them. 133 There is, however, no requirement
that the plan remain with any particular reviewing company for a
particular period of time and no restriction against dropping one
company from the rotation and selecting another. Consumer
groups have therefore questioned whether such an arrangement
can truly be without bias. 134

informal dispute resolution. You can expect to receive a status report
from the assigned benefits advisor every 30 days. If your valid complaint
cannot be resolved informally, it may be referred for further review by
our enforcement staff. While we cannot ensure that every complaint will
result in an investigation, at the conclusion of enforcement activity, if
requested, we will furnish an understandable explanation of the
outcome of our review and investigation.
About the Employee Benefits Security Administration, www.dol.gov/ebsa/about
ebsa/main.html (last accessed Mar. 15, 2014).
130. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, supra note 108, at 4 (noting that most
individuals surveyed did not know where to seek help and that the “burdens of
illness made it harder to resolve problems on their own”). In the Kaiser
report’s case studies, person after person reported that they did not know their
state had a Consumer Assistance Program. See id. at 23 (stating“[Consumer]
did not know her state has a Consumer Assistance Program that would help
her file an appeal”); see id. at 25 (describing a consumer who wrote to his
congressman and others for help but did not know his state had a Consumer
Assistance Program that could have helped him with appeals).
131. Harmon, supra note 76, at 440.
132. Supra note 94.
133. Id. “Random selection” is also permitted as a means to reduce bias. Id.
Aetna, for example, has contracted with three independent review
organizations—each, then, stands to receive a large amount of business from
this significant company. Appeals and External Review Q&A, available at
https://www.aetna.com/health-reform-connection/questions-answers/appealsexternal-review.html (last accessed Mar. 15, 2014).
134. A letter from twenty-four consumer and patient advocate
organizations submitted as part of the public comment period for the
regulations explained that
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C. External Review as a Barrier to Relief in Federal
Court and a Reported Decision
External review has certain advantages, such as lower costs
and greater availability than resort to federal court. But unlike
judicial opinions, external reviewers’ decisions need not explain
their reasoning publicly, for the benefit of subsequent plan
participants.
With external review, plan participants receive a decision
without paying court costs and attorneys’ fees, but participants are
also denied the benefits of a confrontation in open court, the
opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, a public judicial opinion
with accompanying reasoning, and the ability to set and benefit
from precedent. 135 A plan may voluntarily change its claimsprocessing strategy in response to IRO decisions, and there are
some reported instances of such an effect. 136 Plans are not

[W]hen insurers or plans act as the hub, receiving the appeal, choosing
the outside reviewer, receiving the decision of the outside reviewer, and
then issuing a decision to the consumer, outcomes are skewed in favor of
insurers or plans. We also can cite cases in which an IRO ruled in favor
of consumers in true external appeals administered by States, but the
same so-called IRO ruling on the same treatment for the same condition
rule for the plan when the outside reviewer was selected by the plan.
Letter from Advocates for Patients with Chronic Illness to Phyllis Borzi &
Karen Pollitz, Dated Jan. 31, 2011, available at http://advocacyforpatients
.blogspot.com/2011/01/advocates-letter-on-appeal-regulations.html
(last
accessed Mar. 15, 2014); KAREN POLLITZ, GERALDINE DALLEK & NICOLE
TOPAY, INST. FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & POLICY: EXTERNAL REVIEW OF
HEALTH PLAN DECISIONS: AN UPDATE 11-12 (May 2000), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/external-review.pdf
(discussing concerns regarding conflicts of interest, particularly where the
reviewing entity performs other takes for the plan or issuer).
135. Harmon, supra note 76, at 440 (noting also that “the reform law
purports to add additional accountability through the new process
requirements with disclosure of decisional rationales and opportunities for
submission of additional evidence, but in the end, all for what amounts to
paper file review”).
136. See KAREN POLLITZ, GERALDINE DALLEK & NICOLE TOPAY, INST. FOR
HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & POLICY: EXTERNAL REVIEW OF HEALTH PLAN
DECISIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY PROGRAM FEATURES IN THE STATES AND
MEDICARE 6 (1998), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress
.com/2013/04/3928.pdf (noting that “[a]t the outset of Pennsylvania’s program,
for example, a significant portion of reviews involved denial of emergency
room care. Over time, the number of such reviews has dwindled and
regulators attribute this to HMOs learning and understanding the state’s
expectations.”); see also Laura B. Benko, Upon Further Review, 35 MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Feb. 7, 2005, at 29 (explaining that when claim denials for
bariatric procedures such as gastric bypass surgery, were routinely overturned
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required to do so, however, and plan participants do not have
access to past decisions in order to assert them as precedent.
During the public comment period on the new rules, some urged
that information on IRO decisions should be released 137 but these
arguments were not successful. External review decisions, then,
are non-public and are not subject to the courts’ standard of stare
decisis.
For plans, another advantage of this lack of public scrutiny is
that the practices that might have led a claimant to appeal a claim
three times remain hidden. Once a claim reaches federal court, the
judge examines the entire record and may comment on claims
processing practices or failures to follow the rules. 138 Resolution of
claims at the external review level allows plans to avoid the
judicial scoldings that they have received in the past and that
become part of the permanent public record. 139
It is as yet unclear whether external review can serve as a
mandatory step prior to filing a claim in federal court. Where a
plan does not describe external review as a requirement of the
administrative process, courts have denied motions to dismiss
based on arguments that the plaintiff has not exhausted the
administrative process. 140 In some sense, then, the purportedly
ameliorative step of external review is a new roadblock between
the healthcare consumer and the consumer’s ability to seek
benefits by suing the plan and obtaining official precedent in the
form of a judicial opinion.

by external review, insurers began to cover the procedure more often in the
first instance).
137. In the course of the public comment period for the new regulations,
the American Association of Retired Persons urged that external reviewers be
required to release the following details:
(1) cases handled (redacted for privacy); (2) the name of the plan or
issuer; (3) description of the issue; (4) approximate cost of the claim; (5)
result (favorable to plan or insurer, or to participant); (6) the number of
past reviews for each insurer or plan; (7) professional credentials of
reviewer(s) used; and (8) compensation paid to each physician reviewer
for the year and the two previous calendar years.
Letter from AARP to the Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., Emp. Benefits
Sec. Admin., and the Internal Revenue Serv., Dated Sept. 21, 2010,
www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/1210-AB45-0059.pdf (last accessed Mar. 15, 2014).
138. See, e.g., Schoedinger v. United Healthcare, No. 4:04-cv-664 SNL,
2006 WL 3803935, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 2006) (noting that “insurance
companies regularly reduce and deny claims without cause”).
139. Id.
140. Goldman v. BCBSM Found., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1021 (E.D. Mich. 2012).
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THE INCOMPLETE PROMISE OF HEALTHCARE
REFORM

Although the will to reform and expand multiple aspects of
American healthcare prevailed in 2009, the will to reform ERISA
preemption did not. With employers and plans long accustomed to
ERISA’s freedom from accountability in claims processing, any
change to the status quo in that regard proved unacceptable.
The ACA’s revisions to claims processing rules are not
without some benefit. Ultimately, however, to keep ERISA
preemption in place is to allow plans to escape accountability with
regard to claims processing and the damage it can cause. In
addition, the continued preemption of state law claims means that
attorneys have no incentive to participate, and only the most
tenacious and sophisticated plan participants will navigate the
appeals process to have their denials reversed. Meanwhile, the
plan participants who abandon their claim denials bear the brunt
of ERISA’s cost-saving effect, effectively keeping costs lower for
the employer and other plan participants.

A. Enhanced Claims Processing Protections for
Participants
Without a doubt, consumers have some enhanced protections
under the ACA, as well as additional resources when facing a
problem with their claims. The claims processing reforms have
brought increased access to information, so plan participants can
engage with their providers and work out how to appeal a claim. 141
External review has been a boon for many, particularly those with
expensive, one-time treatments or a single chronic condition; for
these situations, the long march through two levels of internal
review and eventual external review makes sense and may be
possible. Given the high rate at which denials are reversed on
external review, 142 the process has certainly allowed some to
obtain benefits that they would not have received before. The new
rules provide greater access to timely information regarding the
plan’s basis for denials, information that can assist participants in
preparing an appeal.
In the end, though, the rules keep the burden on participants

141. Juliette Forstenzer Espinosa, Strengthening Appeals Rights for
Privately-Insured Patients: The Impact of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act, Public Health Reports, Jul.-Aug. 2012, at 460, available at
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3366385/#B23 (last accessed Mar. 16,
2014).
142. Infra note 150.
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to understand a complex web of rights, sift through paperwork and
reasoning, and marshal medical evidence, all while battling the
underlying illness that is producing the claims—a challenging
prospect indeed. And, if the plan does not follow the rules and
improperly denies the benefit, causing disruption, burden on the
participant, and medical harm, there is still no remedy. ERISA
plan participants who opt to sue stand to receive nothing but the
value of the denied benefit. Even attorney’s fees are rarely
awarded, and generally not unless the claim is actually litigated,
so the protracted struggle through the appeals process is strictly at
the participant’s expense. 143

B. Preemption as Cost Control
While judicial opinions in ERISA preemption cases are
notorious for their complexity, 144 employers’ main reason for
supporting ERISA preemption is simple: cost. 145 Managed care is
of course predicated on contracts between employers, plans, and
patients—these contracts often feature financial incentives that
reduce unnecessary use of healthcare dollars. 146 These incentives
can run counter to the best interests of patients. Health plans
have long sought to control costs through capitation, utilization
review, physician incentives, and other arrangements. 147 In the
end, the current system of ERISA preemption is simply another

143. See supra note 122 (noting that attorney’s fees are not available for
consumers’ efforts to obtain reversal of denied claims during the
administrative phase).
144. See Hughes Aircraft v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 447 (1999) (noting that
ERISA is a “complex and reticulated statute”) (citing Nachman Corp. v.
Pension Ben. Guaranty Corp., 446 U.S. 359, 361 (1980)); see also Mertens v.
Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993) (describing ERISA as “enormously
complex and detailed.”).
145. See supra note 62 (arguing that the loss of ERISA preemption would
expose employer companies to vast liability and lawsuits); see also ERISA
PREEMPTION HEARING, supra note 11, at 33-34 (discussing financial impact of
changes to ERISA preemption and predicting that many employers would
scale back coverage or charge more if preemption were altered).
146. Leatrice Berman-Sandler, Independent Medical Review: Expanding
Legal Remedies to Achieve Managed Care Accountability, 13 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 233, 235 (Winter 2004).
147. See David Villar Patton, Achieving Managed Care Accountability by
Ending the ERISA Preemption Defense, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1423, 1426 (1998)
(explaining cost control mechanisms such as capitation, utilization review, and
others); Patricia A. Danzon, Tort Liability: A Minefield for Managed Care, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 498 (1997) (noting that capitation “shift[s] from passive
payment of providers, based on fee-for-service or costs incurred, to various
forms of fixed fee payment for a comprehensive episode or period of care,
regardless of the volume or cost of services actually delivered”).
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such form of cost control.
Both sides of the ERISA preemption debate agree that if there
were no ERISA preemption, individuals who suffer from the
consequences of improper claims processing would seek a remedy,
and the incentive of state-law damages would encourage more
attorneys to participate. 148 This would naturally cost plans more,
as they would have to defend against the lawsuits and pay
damages when necessary, which they do not currently have to pay.
A rejection of preemption reform does not, of course, make the cost
of improper claim denials disappear, but instead places them back
on the individual participants who have suffered the denied claims
and any consequences.
When a benefit is improperly denied, a plan participant can
do one of two things: absorb the cost of the denied benefit himself,
or go forward in the multi-level appeal process and attempt to
have the denial reversed. Currently, and particularly with regard
to smaller claim amounts, the overwhelming majority of plan
participants are opting to absorb the cost of improperly denied
claims themselves. 149 Those with the time and energy to go
forward and advocate for themselves (or perhaps for a relative)
meet with an excellent chance of success: when pursued to the
level of external review, denials are overturned at a rate of about
forty percent. 150 To reach external review, however, participants
must remain tenacious through multiple levels of internal review,
with the necessary deadlines, gathering of evidence, and
marshalling of evidence. 151

148. See, e.g., Senate Hearing, supra note 11, at 33-34.
149. Supra note 114.
150. Karen Pollitz et al., Assessing State External Review Programs & the
Effects of Pending Federal Patients’ Right Legislation, at v. (May 2002),
available at www.docin.com/p-347938894.html. See also New York State
Insurance Department Annual Report of the Superintendent (2010), available
at www.dfs.ny.gov/reportpub/insurance/annrpt2010.pdf (providing that New
York State reports annually on its state external review program. While the
results may not necessarily be similar to the results of external review under
the new ACA rules, the results are still instructive. In 2010, the Department
of Insurance received 4,955 applications for external review; of those, 1,869
were not eligible for external review. With regard to 361 applications, the
insurance company spontaneously paid the claim, even before the external
review took place. Of the 2,370 assigned to external review, 940, or 40 percent,
were overturned in favor of the consumer.).
151. See The Iowa Insurance Division, Consumer Advocate Bureau, A
Consumer’s Guide to Internal and External Reviews, available at
http://insuranceca.iowa.gov/health/aconsumersguidetoappealsandexternalrevi
ew.pdf (noting that The Iowa Department of Insurance warns individuals with
denied claims that they should plan ahead, request documents, and be
prepared to make their case: “If your claim was denied as being not medically
necessary, you should ask your medical provider for your medical records and
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Those who are in the most difficulty—those too overwhelmed
to learn about appeal processes and actually appeal—end up
paying for medical care that the plan should have paid. In
addition, less sophisticated plan participants may not fully
understand their appeal rights or may feel uncomfortable
advocating against institutions linked to their employment. These
plan participants too, if they abandon appeals of improperlydenied claims, absorb the cost of plan errors and keep costs lower
for other participants. This represents part of ERISA preemption’s
cost savings, because if preemption were removed, the availability
of state law remedies would mean that attorneys would be more
likely to participate and help participants sue.
Are plan participants from the middle and lower
socioeconomic classes contributing more to ERISA plans’ cost
savings than participants from the middle to upper socioeconomic
classes? Some commentators suspect so. Well before external
review became part of the ACA, one commentator predicted that
required external review of denied healthcare claims would
“further rig the system still further in favor of the privileged
minority of upper-middle-class consumers.” 152 As an illustration,
he noted the heroic efforts of the plaintiff in Rush Prudential HMO
v. Moran 153 to obtain her choice of treatment and then successfully
seek reimbursement for it. 154 When conventional therapies failed
her, she sought an unusual surgery from an out-of-state expert;
her plan refused to approve the surgery. 155 She underwent the
surgery anyway, paying $94,841.27 and then suing the plan for
reimbursement. 156 When only a few are able to take such steps
and work through the system with such persistence, wherewithal,
and financial resources, then those who cannot take these steps
bear the costs—the plan ends up paying for treatments sought by
such individuals, while those who cannot negotiate the system

a letter explaining why the denied treatment was prescribed and why other
forms of treatment were not appropriate. If your claim was denied as being
‘experimental or investigational,’ you should ask your medical provider for
your medical records, studies establishing the effectiveness of this service, and
a letter explaining these studies and the treatment rationale. It may take
some time for your medical providers to produce the supporting documents
you request. Allow several weeks to get your medical records and a letter from
your medical provider, especially if you are requesting them from a large
hospital or clinic.” Claimants must prepare themselves for a considerable
paper chase).
152. Supra note 20, at 92.
153. Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
154. Supra note 20, at 92.
155. Supra note 153, at 360-61.
156. Id. at 361.
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represent costs savings to the plan. 157
While the Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran example is
perhaps extreme, the Kaiser Family Foundation’s recent study
confirms the burden on everyday plan participants. 158 The study
presents case after case of individuals ground down by medical
expenses, yet so burdened by work and medical care that they are
unable to find out about appeals or to find time to file one. 159 None
of the individuals in the case studies indicated that they knew
about the Citizens Assistance Programs. 160
An additional aspect of the ERISA preemption cost savings is
that plans need not pay the consequence for wrongful claims
processing or negligent decisions. The risk of an improper denial is
borne by the individual plan participant alone, even though the
consequences for any individual can be highly significant.
The enduring question, then, is whether this allocation of risk
and cost is the proper one—that effectively, the energetic and
sophisticated plan participant prevails in navigating the appeals
process and having improper denials overturned, while the passive
participant pays the price. And whether the participant is able to
navigate the appeals process or not, any consequences flowing
from the wrongful denial remain with the plan participant.

V.

CONCLUSION

It is unlikely that ERISA will be reformed in the near
future—after all, numerous groups have an interest in keeping it
the way it is. 161 The employer and insurer lobby is organized and
ready to act whenever an anti-preemption bill is introduced.
Without further changes to the claims process and ultimately, to
ERISA preemption, the ACA includes more people in health plans
but also leaves them vulnerable to the vagaries of health plan
decision-makers. The promise of universal, meaningful healthcare
coverage therefore remains incomplete.

157. Supra note 20, at 84.
158. Supra note 111.
159. Id.
160. Supra note 130.
161. Brendan S. Maher, Thoughts on the Latest Battles Over ERISA’s
Remedies, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 339, 443 (Spring 2013).

